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DIARY NOTES

DD/S *W*

16 July 1962

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1. [REDACTED] was in to report to me on the meeting that he attended on 13 July at the White House, which was chaired by Commander Shephard, the President's Naval Aide, to discuss telecommunications in connection with emergency planning. There are to be a series of meetings by this Committee in compliance with National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 127. [REDACTED] felt that the principals will not attend all of these briefings, and he has designated [REDACTED] as his alternate. The key question to be resolved, insofar as we are concerned, is to set forth the essential communications which we foresee to have with the President in time of national emergency and in connection with the program for the continuity of Government. [REDACTED] has been asked to prepare such a paper. I suggested that he check in the first instance with Ray Cline and [REDACTED] and that this paper eventually be cleared with Mr. McCone prior to signature by [REDACTED] and dispatch to the Committee.

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2. I attended two long meetings with General Carter, Emmett Echols, Larry Houston, [REDACTED] and others today in connection with the [REDACTED] exercise. We were assembled in the DCI Conference Room at 11:00 a.m., at which time General Carter delivered a dissertation of about thirty minutes, saying in substance that he could not go along with the [REDACTED] exercise and issuing a whole new series of instructions for the continuation of the exercise on a piece-meal basis. Several of us, particularly Larry Houston and myself, were particularly concerned at the legal implications of carrying out General Carter's instructions and, in fact, felt that we could not "have our cake and eat it, too." I made a very strong presentation, I think, at this meeting, as well as at the subsequent meeting in the afternoon, to the effect that the Agency would be done great harm by this approach. I told General Carter that I thought he had to make a decision as to whether he would accept the [REDACTED] exercise and go ahead with it with only a few appeals to be honored or whether he wanted to scratch the entire exercise. I said that I strongly recommended the former course and against the latter course. I argued that he should accept the decision made by his predecessors (i.e., that there should be such an exercise), that he should accept the procedures which were approved by them and cleared with so many echelons of the Government in order to get the program established, and that he should limit his decisions in the present circumstances to honoring appeals in those cases where he thought an injustice

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had been done, procedures had been violated, a person was not, in fact, surplus to the Clandestine Services, etc. (I do not know at this point what course of action General Carter will choose to follow, but I am inclined to believe that we have impressed him somewhat that he is "too far down the road" to change courses in this particular exercise at this point.)

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3. I talked to [REDACTED] of Technical Services Division about their request for money to aid in the education of one of Mr. [REDACTED] sons. I told him that I had checked this with General Counsel and that we found it very difficult to approve the request. In fact, I said that I did not feel that I could approve it on the grounds submitted and that I would have to take it to General Carter for his guidance. Mr. [REDACTED] asked for time to consult with [REDACTED] the Acting Chief of TSD. Later Dr. [REDACTED] called to say that he felt that this action really was operational security in that, by so doing, [REDACTED] would be kept in a frame of mind to cooperate fully with the Agency in this particular situation. I told [REDACTED] that I was very sympathetic but was concerned about the precedent and that I would want to check it out with General Carter before making a final commitment.

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4. [REDACTED] was up to brief me on the Manpower Task Force, of which he is a member and [REDACTED] is the Chairman. I agreed that [REDACTED] could be made available to this Task Force, and I also agreed to furnish [REDACTED] a memorandum setting forth my ideas as to some of the DD/S offices which the Task Force might look into.

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5. Jim Garrison advised me that the contractor has now admitted that the air conditioning and heating system is not properly balanced and that he wishes to check it out thoroughly on two successive week ends, preferably July 28 and 29 and August 3 and 4. This would mean that at 4:00 on the preceding Friday afternoons all valves would be opened and temperatures would go as high as 80 degrees in parts of the building over Saturday and Sunday. On the following Mondays, however, things should be back to normal. I have advised General Carter and [REDACTED] of this plan and, receiving no objection from them, have instructed Jim Garrison to go ahead with it.

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